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BUCKLEW V. PRECYTHE: THE
POWER OF ASSUMPTIONS AND
LETHAL INJECTION
RENATA GOMEZ*
INTRODUCTION
Once again, the Supreme Court of the United States has an
opportunity to determine the extent to which death-row inmates can
bring as-applied challenges to the states’ method of execution and
prevent possible botched executions. In Bucklew v. Precythe, the
Court will confront the assumptions that the execution team is
equipped to handle any execution and that the procedure will go as
planned.1 Additionally, the Court will determine whether the standard
articulated in Glossip v. Gross, which requires inmates asserting facial
challenges to the states’ method of execution to plead a readily
available alternative method of execution, further extends to inmates
asserting as-applied challenges.2 If inmates must plead an alternative
method less likely to cause severe pain, the Court will clarify whether
such motions for summary judgment should be decided based on the
record as a whole or if the inmate must present evidence comparing
the two alternative methods of execution through the testimony of a
single witness.3 Based on these findings, the Court will determine
whether Bucklew met the standard under Glossip v. Gross.4
This commentary argues that inmates launching an as-applied
challenge to the state’s method of execution should be given relevant
discovery regarding the execution teams’ qualifications, that inmates
should not have to provide a detailed alternative method of
execution, and that summary judgment decisions should be made
Copyright ©2019 Renata Gomez.
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2020.1. Brief for Petitioner at *i,
Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-8151, 2018 WL 3456065 (U.S. July 16, 2018) (No. 178151[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (referencing Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015)).
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after considering the record as a whole. Only then will inmates be
afforded complete and fair access to the protections of the Eighth
Amendment in the interest of avoiding more botched executions. In
addressing the questions presented, the Court must weigh the ease
with which an inmate can raise a viable challenge to the method of
execution against the State’s ability to carry out a death sentence. The
Supreme Court should remand to the lower court for a further
evidentiary hearing in Bucklew’s case to determine whether
execution by lethal gas significantly reduces a substantial risk of
severe pain compared to lethal injection.
I. FACTS
A. Bucklew’s Medical Condition
A Missouri jury convicted and sentenced Russel Bucklew to death
in 1998 for first degree murder, kidnapping, burglary, forcible rape,
and armed criminal action.5 Bucklew is challenging the method of
execution as it applies to him, not his conviction or death sentence.6
Bucklew suffers from cavernous hemangioma, which causes
“inoperable, blood-filled tumors to grow in his throat and around his
face, head, and neck.”7 Bucklew’s tumors are extremely sensitive,8 so
“merely touching his airway can cause his airway and uvula” to
bleed.9 Bucklew also has difficulty breathing,10 and the peripheral
veins in his hands and arms have been damaged by the illness.11
B. Missouri’s Execution Protocol and History
Missouri’s method of execution statute authorizes execution by
either lethal gas or lethal injection.12 Missouri has not conducted an

5. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *5.
6. See id. (clarifying that “[Bucklew] does not challenge the validity of his conviction or
death sentence”).
7. Id. (citing Joint Appendix Vol. II at *857, *819–20, *220, *328, * 648–49, Buckew v.
Precythe (No. 17-8151), 2018 WL 3473995 (U.S. March 15, 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
Mar. 15, 2018) [hereinafter J.A. II]).
8. J.A. II, supra note 7, at *857.
9. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *5 (citing Joint Appendix Vol. I at *225–26, *228–
29, Bucklew, 2018 WL 3473994 [hereinafter J.A. I]).
10. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *6 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *226–27). But see
Brief of Respondents, at *9, Bucklew, 2018 WL 3969564 (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *643)
(stating that Bucklew has never shown signs of having trouble breathing).
11. J.A. II, supra note 7, at *857.
12. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.720 (West 2007).
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execution by lethal gas since 1965.13 While the state has developed a
written procedure for execution by lethal injection, it does not have a
written procedure for execution by lethal gas.14 While one state
official in Missouri has researched execution via Nitrogen Hypoxia, it
was determined that there was not enough information available to
answer open questions about the procedure.15 However, officials in
Louisiana and Oklahoma concluded that execution by Nitrogen
Hypoxia would be an easy, cheap, and humane method of execution
after extensive investigation.16
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Case Law
The Supreme Court articulated in Helling v. McKinney that an
inmate must show that the state’s execution method presents a risk
that is first, “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless
suffering,” and second, “gives rise to ‘sufficiently imminent
dangers.’”17 In Baze v. Rees, the Court interpreted the standard
presented in Helling to require inmates to show that there is “a
‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an ‘objectively intolerable risk of
harm’ that prevents prison officials from pleading that they were
‘subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.’”18
Then the Court added a second prong: an inmate must proffer an
alternative method of execution that is “feasible, readily
implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of
severe pain.”19 Once the inmate successfully meets the first two
prongs, the state can refuse to adopt the alternative method only if it

13. J.A. II, supra note 7, at *667.
14. See Mo. Dep’t of Corrs. Preparation and Admin. of Chems. for Lethal Injection (Oct.
18 2013), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/ExecutionProtocols/MissouriProtocol10.18.2013
.pdf.
15. Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at *15.
16. See J.A. II, supra note 7, at *736–49 (explaining the finding by researchers in
Oklahoma and Louisiana that death by Nitrogen Hypoxia through a mask or an oxygen tent
would be the most humane method of execution). Researchers also noted that this method
would not require medical professionals because the individual would pass out after their level
of oxygen fell too low; they based their conclusions on studies examining air pilots and
individuals who chose this method as a way to commit suicide.
17. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50–51 (2008) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33,
34–35 (1993)).
18. Id. at 51 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846, and n. 9, 114 S.Ct. 1970,
128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)).
19. Id.
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has a “legitimate penological justification” for keeping its current
execution method.20
Most recently, the Supreme Court applied the elements
articulated in Baze to a challenge against Oklahoma’s method of
execution in Glossip v. Gross.21 In Glossip, the inmates alleged that
the State’s lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment
because Midazolam, the first drug used under this protocal, does not
render an inmate unconscious and therefore creates an unacceptable
risk of severe pain.22 The Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit and held
that the inmates failed to identify a known and available alternative
method of execution that reduces the risk of pain.23 The petitioners in
Glossip proffered the use of sodium thiopental, or pentobarbital, as
part of a single-drug protocol as an alternative to using midazolam.
The Tenth Circuit did not find a clear error in the lower courts’
finding that both drugs were unavailable to the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections.24 The Court also held that the district
court did not commit clear error when it found that the petitioners
did not meet their burden of proof in showing that a massive dose of
midazolam carries a substantial risk of severe pain.25 To support this
decision, the Court cited numerous lower courts that have found that
using midazolam as the first drug in a three-drug protocol is likely to
render an inmate insensate to pain.26
B. Procedural Posture
Bucklew initially filed a complaint with the district court on May
9, 2014 and moved for a stay on May 14, 2014 to provide adequate
time to litigate his claims before his scheduled execution on May 21,
2014.27 The district court dismissed Bucklew’s first five claims for
failing to plead an alternative method of execution.28 An Eighth

20. Id.
21. 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2729 (2015) (“To succeed on an Eighth Amendment method-ofexecution claim, a prisoner must establish that the method created a demonstrated risk of
severe pain and that the risk is substantial when compared to the known and available
alternatives.”)
22. Id. at 2731.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2738.
25. Id. at 2731.
26. See id. at 2739–40.
27. Id. at *17.
28. Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014, at *6–7 (W.D. Mo.
May 19, 2014), rev’d by 783 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2015).
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Circuit panel granted a stay, but the stay was vacated en banc later
that day.29 The Supreme Court, however, ordered a stay of execution
while he litigated his appeal.30 The Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding that
plaintiffs asserting an as-applied challenge must proffer an alternative
method of execution.31 Bucklew filed his Fourth Amended Complaint
in which he challenged the constitutionality of Missouri’s execution
protocol as it applied to him.32 He alleged that Missouri’s lethal
injection protocol inflicted needless suffering and therefore violated
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.33 The Complaint also, for the first time, proffered lethal
gas as an alternative method of execution.34
On remand, Bucklew sought discovery regarding the
qualifications and training of medical members of the execution
team.35 Although the district court denied the majority of Bucklew’s
discovery requests, it granted discovery regarding: the identity of the
chemical to be used for the lethal injection; the chemical’s expected
effect; the general composition of the medical team and functions of
those persons; information about how the State had used cyanide gas;
and information about the States research into the feasibility of using
nitrogen.36 The district court then granted the State’s motion for
summary judgment, concluding that the record did not present a
genuine dispute concerning whether execution by lethal gas would
significantly reduce Bucklew’s risk of needless suffering, as compared
to Missouri’s lethal injection protocol.37

29. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565 Fed.Appx. 562 (8th Cir. 2014), vacated en banc, 134 S. Ct.
2333 (2014).
30. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 572 U.S. 1131 (2014).
31. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1127–28 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (rejecting
Bucklew’s argument that he was not required to propose an alternative method of execution
because he was not raising a facial challenge to Missouri’s execution protocol).
32. See generally Fourth Amended Complaint, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No.14-08000, 2015
WL 13717950 (W.D.Mo.) (challenging the constitutionality of Missouri’s execution protocol as
it applied to Bucklew).
33. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *16 (quoting J.A. I, supra note 9, at *85-86 ¶¶ 148,
151). See generally Fourth Amended Complaint, Bucklew, 2015 WL 13717950.
34. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *16 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *85 ¶ 150). See
generally Fourth Amended Complaint, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No.14-08000, 2015 WL 13717950
(W.D.Mo.).
35. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *18.
36. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at *18 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *116–26).
37. J.A. II, supra note 7, at *828–32.
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III. HOLDING
A divided Eighth Circuit panel38 affirmed the district court’s
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the State and vacated
the stay,39 concluding that Bucklew provided no evidence showing
that lethal gas would substantially reduce his risk of severe pain.40 The
Court of Appeals reasoned that he did not meet the Glossip standard
because the evidence showing a difference between the two methods
had not come from a single witness.41 The panel majority also upheld
the district court’s decision to deny Bucklew’s request for discovery
into the qualifications of the execution team,42 and denied Bucklew’s
petition for a panel rehearing or a rehearing en banc, as well as his
motion for an emergency stay.43 On April 30, 2018, the Supreme Court
stayed Bucklew’s execution and granted his petition for writ of
certiorari.44
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner first argues that Glossip and Baze do not require courts
to assume neiither that state personnel are competent to deal with a
medical condition nor that the execution will go as planned. These
assumptions effectively void the purpose of as-applied challenges
because the inmates bringing such challenges will necessarily assert
that the procedure will not go as intended.45 Consequently, the
discovery requested by Bucklew regarding the qualifications of the
execution team was relevant because the Director of Missouri’s
Department of Corrections testified that she would rely upon the

38. Bucklew v. Precythe, 883 F.3d 1087, 1100 (8th Cir. 2018) (Colloton, J., dissenting) (“If
the factfinder accepted [expert testimony from both parties] as to the effect of nitrogen gas, then
Bucklew’s proposed alternative method would significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe
pain.”). Justice Colloton also observed that the general rule allows the trier of fact to accept all
or just a part of any witnesses’ testimony, and that on summary judgment one party can rely on
a portion of the opposing party’s expert’s testimony to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Id.
39. Bucklew, 883 F.3d at 1090.
40. Id. at 1094.
41. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *24 (stating that the 8th Circuit “imposed a
novel rule that a claimant cannot prevail unless all elements of his claim are established through
the testimony of a single expert witness”).
42. 883 F.3d at 1096–97.
43. J.A. II, supra note 7, at *884–87.
44. Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17–8151, 138 S.Ct. 1706 (2018) (mem.).
45. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *25–30.
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execution team to make judgments as to how to handle Bucklew’s
unique medical condition.46 Additionally, the amount of information
that the execution team has regarding his condition directly impacts
the risk of severe suffering.47 Without his medical history, the team
will be unable to tailor the execution protocol, such as by refraining
from placing the gurney in a flat position, to Bucklew’s unique
needs.48
Petitioner further asserts that discovery was relevant because
Missouri’s protocol allows the medical team to attempt to access the
femoral vein “provided they have appropriate training, education and
experience for that procedure.”49 Missouri’s protocol itself makes the
qualifications of the medical team relevant to assessing the risk of
pain.50 The State’s appellate strategy also illustrates the relevance of
the requested discovery in Bucklew’s case because the State provided
an incomplete affidavit, which indicated that Bucklew would not need
to lie supine during the procedure.51 Furthermore, Bucklew did not
have a chance to learn what role the State’s witness plays in the
execution or whether she has the authority to direct the medical
members of the execution team.52 Thus, petitioner asserts that the
lower court erred in applying these assumptions to Bucklew’s claim
and in finding that the requested discovery was irrelevant.53
Next, Petitioner argues that the assumptions surrounding the
execution and the medical team’s qualifications are erroneous
because they conceal “a kind of cruelty that has been a focus of this
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for decades” and indicate a
46. See id. at *32 (“Anne Precythe [the Director] has testified that she knows nothing
about Bucklew’s medical condition and would defer to the [unnamed nurse] and the [unnamed
anaesthologist] regarding how to handle any issues that might arise during the execution, such
as how to position Bucklew or obtain venous access.”).
47. See id. (“The less the team knows, the greater Bucklew’s risk of needless suffering.”).
48. See id. at 33–34 (“The summary judgment record reflects that inmates in prior
executions have been required to lie supine, and no one testified that Bucklew would be treated
any differently.”).
49. J.A. I, supra note 9, at *214.
50. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *33.
51. Id. at *33–34 (explaining that the affidavit provided by the State’s witness does not
discuss whether Bucklew will have to lie supine if a cutdown procedure is necessary and that it is
inconsistent with the testimony of the witness’s superior, who said that she would leave
decisions regarding positioning to the medical team).
52. Id.
53. See id. at *30 (“In the absence of that erroneous assumption, no sound principle . . .
supports depriving an inmate of the opportunity to ensure that the medical members of the
execution team are informed about the details of his complicating medical condition, and are
equipped to manage it so that the inmate does not needlessly suffer.”).
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“deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s medical condition.54 The state
officials, asserts petitioner, would violate the Eighth Amendment by
showing a deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical condition
because their lack of accomodation constitutes an “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.”55 Petitioner contends that the State’s
decision to proceed with the ordinary execution protocol would show
a deliberate indifference if state officials are aware that an inmate
suffers from a rare medical condition that makes him uniquely likely
to suffer during the procedure.56 Additionally, if the execution goes
badly, it would not be an “innocent” mistake,57 but instead would
deny “the essential human dignity” of the officials who carry out the
execution “by making them an unwitting party to foreseeable
cruelty.”58 Lastly, the assumptions proffered by the Eighth Circuit “in
effect absolve[] respondents of their decision to take an unjustified
risk,” and “leaves state officials free to ignore that risk so long as the
execution would be humane if all goes as intended.”59
Bucklew further asserts that the Court should not require inmates
who raise an as-applied challenge to design an alternative method of
execution because they do not present the same risk to the death
penalty as facial challenges.60 In as-applied challenges, the inmates are
not challenging the death penalty itself as unconstitutional, nor do
they seek a judgment that would require the state to alter its
execution protocol as to any other inmate.61 Instead, they are only
asking that the execution protocol be invalidated in their specific
cases.62 Importantly, the concern that it would be difficult for a court
to discern whether the method is cruel and unusual without a pleaded
alternative is not relevant in as-applied challenges that are based on
an inmate’s unique medical condition63 because the state’s refusal to
accommodate the inmate after he makes a substantial showing of risk
would itself be a basis to consider the method cruel and unusual.64
54. Id. at *28.
55. Id. at *28 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
56. Id. at *28–29.
57. Id. at *29 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (plurality opinion)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at *29–30.
60. Id. at *35–36 (stating that Bucklew’s as-applied challenge presents none of the
concerns that prompt the requirement to provide an alternative in other cases, such as depriving
the government of the only available means of carrying out capital punishment).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *42–43.
64. Id. at 43.
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Even if the Court determines that inmates must assert an
alternative method of execution, Bucklew argues that the Eighth
Circuit’s interpretation of Glossip requiring that the inmate produce
evidence supporting a method of execution claim through the
testimony of a single witness conflicts with summary judgment rules.65
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit erred because it did not consider “what
a reasonable factfinder could have concluded had it heard the whole
of what both experts had to say,” and did not consider the substantial
risks that the lethal injection protocol poses to Bucklew before the
lethal drug is administered when calculating the risks.66 If the court
had considered the medical expert testimony offered by both parties,
thus considering the record as a whole, the court would have found
that execution by lethal gas would significantly reduce the substantial
risk of severe pain.67 Furthermore, the opinion in Glossip did not
establish this single witness standard for method of execution claims,68
and this burden would cripple as-applied challenges to methods of
execution because many experts who can offer that type of opinion
are ethically barred from asserting a better way to implement the
death penalty.69
Moreover, Bucklew contends that he met this burden under
Glossip because Respondents did not allege that lethal gas was
unavailable.70 Additionally, Bucklew supported the proposition that
execution by lethal gas would significantly reduce his risk of pain
because it would shorten the period of time during which he would be
conscious while choking on his own blood.71 Petitioner asserts that he

65. Id. at 45 (citing Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)) (noting that
evidence at summary judgment should be evaluated in light of the record as a whole).
66. Id. at 46.
67. See J.A. II, supra note 7, at *877 (Colloton, S., dissenting) (“If the factfinder accepted
Dr. Zivot’s testimony as to the effect of pentobarbital, and Dr. Antognini’s uncontroverted
testimony as to effect of nitrogen gas, then Bucklew’s proposed alternative method would
significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe pain that the district court identified in its
analysis of the first element.”).
68. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1 at *47.
69. See id. at 48 (explaining that witnesses with the requisite medical training “are likely to
be unable, consistent with professional ethical standards, to propose an alternative method of
execution that will substantially reduce the risk of suffering”). See also The Hippocratic Oath,
wherein new medical professionals recite, “I will . . . benefit my patients according to my
greatest ability and judgement, and I will do no harm or injustice to them,” and vow, “I will not
give a lethal drug to anyone if I am asked, nor will I advise such a plan.”,
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/ greek_oath.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
70. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *51.
71. Id.
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“faces identifiable severe risks from the procedure both before and
after the medical team gains venous access and the non-medical team
begins to administer the lethal drug.”72 Particularly, Bucklew’s tumors
are likely to rupture due to the repeated attempts by the medical
team to start an IV.73
Even if the execution team is successful in starting an IV line,
Bucklew argues that he is at an increased risk of his vein blowing,74
and he would be in extreme pain if a vein blows because
pentobarbital would leak and destroy the surrounding tissue.75
Furthermore, the petitioner warns that he will lose the ability to
manage his airway after the lethal drug begins to flow76 and will begin
to suffocate on his own blood.77 If the execution team does not gain
access to a peripheral vein, they will likely try to start an IV in the
femoral vein.78 This procedure, petitioner asserts, will cause him to
convulse and that the execution team may pierce the femoral artery.79
Finally, Petitioner argues that inmates should not be required to
completely design the alternative method of execution because the
State is in a better position than inmates to develop the detailed
protocols.80 Inmates have limited access to resources in prisons,
probably have no experience in writing procedures, and will have
difficulty receiving guidance from a medical professional due to
ethical constraints.81 Furthermore, the requirement that an inmate
designs a detailed step-by-step protocol for his execution does not
advance the purpose of the known-and-available-alternatives
requirement.82
B. Respondent’s Arguments
The State argues that “courts ‘must and do assume that the state
officials carr[y] out their duties under the death warrant in a careful

72. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *10 (emphasis omitted).
73. Id. at *11 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *183, *186–87, *232, *234–35, *351).
74. Id. (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *340–41, *189–90).
75. Id. (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *332–33).
76. Id. (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *233).
77. Id. (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *234–35).
78. Id. (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *611–12) (noting that the execution team has used
the cutdown procedure in the past when attempts at peripheral access failed).
79. Id. at *12 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *343– 45, 232–35).
80. Id. at *52–53.
81. Id. at *53.
82. Id.
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and humane manner.”83 Respondents claim, moreover, that Bucklew’s
evidence supports only the prediction of isolated mishaps that would
not violate the Eighth Amendment because he would be unable to
feel pain twenty to thirty seconds after the pentobarbital was injected
into his system,84 and his prediction that the medical team may have
difficulty inserting an IV line does not establish a sufficiently
substantial risk of harm when the State has put in place important
safeguards as a matter of law.85 Here, Missouri has incorporated
safeguards,86 such as mandating the presence of an anesthesiologist
and a nurse during executions.87 Although there is disagreement as to
the amount of information the medical team will have ahead of
Bucklew’s execution, Respondents claim that the medical records
they receive will contain more than a one-page summary of his
medical condition.88
Respondents further argue that the delay from granting Bucklew’s
discovery request would have been disproportional to the needs of
the case because his claim is refuted by existing evidence.89
Petitioner’s claim that the medical team will repeatedly fail to start an
IV line is unfounded because it ignores the possibility of accessing a
peripheral vein in Bucklew’s foot, a procedure he has not claimed
would be abmormally difficult.90 Nor, for that matter, does the record
support the contention that the medical team would have difficulty
establishing a central line, or that he would have to go through a
cutdown procedure,91 which involves “slicing into the leg to visualize
the vein.”92 Any error that the Court made in the decision to deny
discovery, moreover, was harmless because Bucklew failed to provide

83. Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at *39 (quoting State of La. ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1974)) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original).
84. Id. at *38 (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48, 50 (2008)).
85. Id. at *39–40 (quoting 553 U.S. at 55).
86. Id. at *40 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *213–14).
87. J.A. I, supra note 9, at *336, *380 (asserting that both medical professionals involved
are trained to gain IV access through peripheral veins and that all board-certified
anesthesiologists are trained to access central veins if necessary during Bucklew’s execution).
88. Brief of Respondent, supra note 10, at *40 (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *627). But
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *7–8 (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *523–24) (stating
that the medical team responsible for the execution will not examine or meet with Bucklew
before the execution and will only be given a single-page summary, not Bucklew’s complete
medical record).
89. Id. at *53 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).
90. Id. at *53 (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *821).
91. Id.
92. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *8 (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *616–18).
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an alternative method of execution,93 the district court dismissed the
only count that hinged on the execution team’s training,94 and he
never claimed that his suffering would be caused by difficulty in
accessing his veins in his Fourth Amended Complaint.95
Respondents argue that Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that
he is “sure or very likely” to suffer severe pain during the lethal
injection procedure because he will be unconscious within thirty
seconds after the medical team administers pentobarbital.96 Therefore,
even if Bucklew experiences a blocked airway during the procedure,
the execution protocol would not amount to a “serious harm” in
violation of the Eighth Amendment since he would be unconscious.97
Furthermore, Bucklew’s expert did not estimate how long it would
take for Bucklew to become unconscious, which would occur before
brain death,98 rendering the testimony that brain death would occur
between 52 and 240 seconds after starting lethal injection irrelevant.99
Respondents next contend that Bucklew failed to identify an
alternative method sufficient to satisfy the second element of Glossip
because proffering Nitrogen Hypoxia without more information
regarding the procedure (such as the method, rate, quantity, quality,
concentration, delivery and timing of its administration) does not
identify any known and readily feasible method of execution.100
Additionally, Bucklew’s proposed alternative method is both untested
and vague because no state has ever carried out an execution via
Nitrogen Hypoxia.101 Respondents presented expert testimony that
any opinion about how quickly nitrogen would work in an execution
would not be well founded and that there is no way to determine
whether execution by nitrogen would be cruel.102 Consequently,
Bucklew did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate the
severity and duration of pain he may suffer from an execution by
nitrogen.103 Without this evidence, it is not possible to compare his

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at *54.
Id.
Id. at *51 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *42–94).
Id. at *33.
Id. at *38 (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48, 50 (2008)).
Id. at *34.
Id. at *34 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *196).
Id. at *26.
Id. at *28 (citing McGehee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d 488, 493 (8th Cir 2017)).
Id.
Id. at *28–29.
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pleaded alternative with the State’s lethal injection protocol.104
Bucklew’s claim that lethal gas is less likely to cause severe pain than
lethal injection is therefore unsubstantiated.105
Further, Respondents argue that Bucklew did not prove that the
State refused to comply with his proposed alternative method of
execution without a legitimate penological justification.106 Here, the
State has a penological justification in adhering to lethal injection as
the method of execution because he did not successfully offer an
alternative method that is feasible and readily implemented in
Missouri for reasons discussed earlier.107 Even if Nitrogen Hypoxia
can be considered an alternative method under Glossip, the State is
still justified in adhering to lethal injection because lethal gas has not
been thoroughly tested.108 Similarly, Missouri “has an interest in
preserving the dignity of the procedure” and therefore it may
legitimately refuse to implement an alternative execution method that
causes symptoms that could be perceived by witnesses as signs that
the inmate is conscious and in severe pain.109 Additionally, the public
may be outraged at the State’s use of a gas chamber for capital
punishment because many people were killed by gas in concentration
camps during World War II.110
Next, Respondents argue that the Glossip court explicitly held
that inmates must offer a feasible, readily available alternative
method in all Eighth Amendment method of execution claims,
including as-applied challenges.111 The same principle applies to both
types of challenges: if “capital punishment is constitutional, there
must be a constitutional means of carrying it out.”112 Thus, if an
inmate were to prevail on an as-applied challenge without indicating
an alternative means of execution, then he would effectively be
exempt from capital punishment and the State would be estopped
from carrying through his sentence.113

104. Id..
105. Id.
106. See id. at *41 (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008)).
107. Id. at *42 (citing McGehee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d at 493).
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Baze, 553 U.S. at 57).
110. Id. at *43.
111. Id. at *43 (quoting Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015)) (emphasis in
original).
112. Id. at *44; see also 135 S. Ct. at 2728.
113. Id. at *44.
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The State asserts that the alternative method element in Glossip
should not be waived from as-applied challenges because the element
is essential to showing that state officials were “subjectively
blameless.”114 The necessary mens rea, that State officials were
inflicting pain for the sole purpose of inflicting pain, cannot be
inferred if they use the only feasible method available to them.115
Therefore, state officials cannot show that they are blameless and
acted with a deliberate indifference to the inmates’ suffering unless
there is a requirement to assert an alternative method.116 In other
words, state officials are more easily able to show that they did not
have the culpable state of mind by explaining the reasoning behind
their refusal to use the pleaded alternative.117 Here, Bucklew failed to
provide an alternative method of execution and, therefore, the prison
officials in Missouri chose the only method available to them.118 Since
it is the only available method, the petitioner cannot prove that the
state officials showed a deliberate indifference.119
As a matter of policy, Respondents urge that eliminating the
alternative-method requirement would encourage meritless claims by
inmates in an attempt to delay their execution.120 Respondents worry
that because death sentences have been delayed by an average of
eighteen years,121 inmates will allege that they have developed some
medical condition before the State can carry out the execution,122
resulting in “an explosion” of as-applied challenges.123
Finally, Respondents argue that Bucklew’s as-applied claim is
barred by Missouri’s statute of limitations.124 The State explains that
Bucklew filed an application in 2008, seeking funds partly because he
would likely suffer serious harm amounting to cruel and unusual
punishment during his execution by lethal injection.125 Because this is
the same theory he asserted in his Fourth Amended Complaint, he

114. Id. at *45–46.
115. Id. at *47.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at *47.
121. Id. at *47–48 (citing Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764–2765 (2015) (Breyer, J.
dissenting)).
122. Id. at *48 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at *49.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *657).
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must have asserted it in 2013; and by waiting six years, he allowed the
five-year statute of limitations to run.126 Additionally, Bucklew had
access to the information sufficient to assert this claim before 2014
because his subsequent medical expert came to the same findings as
his first expert.127
Bucklew is further barred by the principal of res judicata because
he could have included his as-applied challenge with the facial
challenge he asserted in prior litigation.128 Therefore, when that suit
became final, he was barred from asserting his as-applied claim.129
Even if Bucklew was not permitted to amend his complaint by the
court, he should have requested permission from the court to split his
claims into separate suits, or sought leave to amend the claim.130 He
could have then appealed from an adverse judgment if the court
denied leave.131 Moreover, the district court did not issue the order
barring Bucklew from amending his complaint until a month after he
asserted that he first learned the basis for this current as-applied
claim.132 Thus, Bucklew assumed the risk that the prior suit would
reach a final judgment first and bar his claims in this suit.133
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court should clarify whether an inmate raising an
as-applied challenge to the method of execution is required to plead
an alternative method of execution under Baze and Glossip. If the
Court determines that inmates bringing as-applied challenges must
provide a readily feasible alternative method, the inmates should have
a genuine opportunity to satisfy these elements without obstacles like
historically invalidated assumptions, unpredictable state influence,
and novel evidentiary burdens. Upholding these obstacles discourages
inmates from bringing as-applied challenges to the state’s method of
execution because the risk is high that inmates would not be able to
satisfy the Glossip standard. Finally, the Court has the opportunity to
126. See id. at *55 (referencing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4)).
127. Id.
128. See Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1095 (8th Cir. 2015) (seeking a declaratory
judgment that the lethal-injection protocol facially violates the Constitution of the United
States, the Missouri Constitution, several provisions of state law, and Missouri common law).
129. Brief of Respondent, supra note 10, at *56.
130. Id. at *57 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1982)).
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *852).
133. Id.
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create a categorical exemption for inmates who show a significant risk
of suffering due to a medical condition. The Supreme Court should
reverse the Eighth Circuit’s holding and remand for an evidentiary
hearing.
The assumptions that the medical personnel on an execution team
have adequate training, and that the execution will go as intended, are
rebuttable according to the text in Glossip and run counter to the
nature of as-applied claims. The Respondents argue in their Brief that
the courts “must and do assume that the state officials carry out their
duties under the death warrant in a careful and humane manner.”134
However, the Glossip court opines in full: “As nothing has been
brought to our attention to suggest the contrary, we must and do
assume that the state officials carried out their duties under the death
warrant in a careful and humane manner.”135 Therefore, even if there
is a presumption, Glossip allows inmates to effectively rebut it
presenting medical evidence demonstrating that they suffers from a
rare medical illness and that the state has not amended their protocol
to specifically mitigate the risks in their cases. Additionally, the state
should not triviliaze as an “accident” the occurrence of severe
suffering that medical experts in these cases predicted because the
two are entirely inconsistent. To predict an outcome is defined as “to
declare or tell in advance”136 and an accident is defined as “any event
that happens unexpectedly.”137 The inmates, and their experts, are
predicting in advance that botched executions will occur if the state
does not take precautions. The harm is, therefore, neither
“unexpected,” nor an “accident,” and may amount to deliberate
indifference by the state officials in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
Furthermore, the inquiry into the qualification of execution team
members should not end with the member’s job title because past
experience shows that the title does not necessarily correspond with
competency.138 For example, a member of Tennessee’s current
134. Id. at *39 (quoting State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1974))
(plurality opinion).
135. 329 U.S. at 462.
136. Random House Webster’s Dictionary 1523 (2d unabr. ed. 2001).
137. Id. at 12.
138. See generally Botched Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-botched-executions (last visited Oct.
22, 2018). See, e.g., Cedwards, 7 of the World’s Most Horrific Botched Executions, LIFE! DEATH!
PRIZES! (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.lifedeathprizes.com/real-life-crime/the-worlds-worstbotched-executions-59193 (reporting that human error was the cause of using a synthetic sponge
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execution team had a history of drug and alcohol addiction, as well
as psychological disorders.139 The same medical team was not trained
in setting up IV lines, administering drugs through the IV lines, or
monitoring the IV lines while the injections are administered.140
Importantly, they were not able to identify several problems that
could occur with IV lines during their use, including “slippage of the
catheter, stopcocks used to set the directional flow of the IV turned in
the wrong direction, and injection of the wrong drug.”141 Despite
evidence to the contrary, the Sixth Circuit in Harbison v. Little hid
behind stare decisis, citing Baze.142 The court vacated and remanded
the judgment back to the lower court, determining that the Tennessee
execution team was adequately trained.143
In another chilling example, Alan Doerhoff, a doctor on Missouri’s
execution team, was diagnosed with dyslexia,144 and admitted that he
both had difficulty reading drug names and improvised drug doses.145
Even though the state of Missouri fired him for his incompetence, he
still supervises executions for the federal government.146 These
instances illustrate the danger and invalidity of these assumptions.
Discovery should be granted to hold the government employess
tasked with administering the death penalty to a higher standard.
Granting discovery may also decrease the frequency of botched
executions.
Moreover, the Respondent’s reasoning that, because one member
of the medical team is an anesthesiologist, Bucklew’s prediction
would only amount to an “isolated mishap” does not hold merit.
Recently, the attempted execution of Doyle Lee Hamm in Alabama
demonstrates the fault in this reasoning.147 After Hamm was

which caused an inmate’s head to catch on fire during execution by electric chair).
139. Harbison v. Little, 571 F.3d 531, 537 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Harbison v. Little, 511 F.
Supp. 2d 872, 887–88 (M.D. Tenn. 2008)).
140. Id. (citing Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 887).
141. Id. (citing 511 F. Supp. 2d at 888–890) (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 539 (citing 511 F. Supp. 2d at 888–890).
143. Id.
144. Mike Pearl, What It’s Like to Be a Death Row Executioner in America, VICE (May 27,
2015, 12:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bnpxp5/how-do-you-get-a-job-as-anexecutioner-in-america-526.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Liliana Segura, Another Failed Execution: The Torture of Doyle Lee Hamm, THE
INTERCEPT (Mar. 3, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/03/03/doyle-hamm-alabamaexecution-lethal-injection; see also Tracy Connor, Doyle Lee Hamm wished for death during
botched execution, report says, NBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2018, 3:40 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
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diagnosed with large-cell lymphoma, Hamm’s attorney had warned
the courts for seven months that the medical team would have
difficulty finding a vein.148 The warnings were ignored. The execution
team inserted needles multiple times in Hamm’s legs and ankles, and
eventually tried to gain access through a central line in his right groin,
despite the State’s own doctor’s warning that there were abnormal
lymph nodes in that area.149 Witnesses recollected that Hamm,
because it was so painful, prayed that the medical team would finally
succeed in taking his life.150 Hamm collapsed once the execution was
called off and was removed from the gurney.151 It was later discovered
that the medical team “almost certainly punctured Doyle’s bladder,
because he was urinating blood for the next day.”152 Thus, medical
evidence supporting the prediction that the medical team will have
difficulty inserting an IV should be sufficient to warrant more
discovery after numerous botched executions.153 To do otherwise
simply because there is an anaesthologist on the execution team
would be to turn a blind eye to the suffering that has already
tarnished the supposedly humane nature of lethal injection.154
The Respondent’s concern that not requiring inmates to plead an
alternative method of execution would result in an “explosion” of
claims is equally unpersuasive because inmates must still satisfy the
pleading standard established by the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2)155 and the Court’s interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.156 The strengthened pleading standard was
storyline/lethal-injection/doyle-lee-hamm-wished-death-during-botched-execution-report-saysn853706.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
PENALTY
INFO.
CENTER,
153. See
Botched
Executions,
DEATH
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-botched-executions (last visited Oct.
22, 2018) (listing examples and causes of botched executions that have occurred in the United
States from 1982 to 2018).
154. It is worth noting that a bill was introduced earlier this year in Missouri that would
abolish the death penalty. H.B. 2218, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018).
155. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (stating that a successful pleading must contain a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
156. See 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that a plaintiff must assert enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face to pass the pleading stage). See also Brief for Amici
Curiae Megan McCracken and Jennifer Moreno in Support of Petitioner, Bucklew v. Precythe,
2018 WL 3584094 (No. 17-8151) (July 23, 2018) (arguing that because as-applied challenges are
based on specific medical conditions that interact with aspects of the lethal injection process,
they are necessarily brought only infrequently, and when an inmate brings such a claim, it will
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created specifically by the Court in Bell to keep out frivolous suits
from advancing and spending resources in discovery. Additionally, the
Court went through great lengths to clarify that it was not a
probability standard.157 Inmates would still need to proffer extensive
medical evidence to “nudge[] their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible” to survive a motion to dismiss, but would
not need to plead that their suffering is “probable.”158 The Court
should not address this concern by treating inmates differently than
other plaintiffs. If the State and Court are concerned with a flood of
as-applied challenges, then the solution must be found elsewhere, such
as through better medical care in prisons to decrease the frequency of
inmates suffering from medical illnesses at the time of execution.
If an inmate who asserts an as-applied challenge to the method of
execution must offer a readily feasible alternative procedure that in
fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain, and further
demeonstrate that the state lacked a penological justification for
rejecting the alternative, then the different execution methods that are
available to an inmate should not be limited by the state’s statute.
First, as argued in the Brief of Scholars and of Academics of
Constitutional Law, the current test to determinine whether the
inmate-offered alternative is readily available to the state is
inconsistent159 and gives the states a veto power over an inmate’s
Eighth Amendment rights.160 Inmates are restricted in some states
because an alternative method is only available if it is authorized by
statute “and/or [the state] has kept its equipment in good operational
order.”161 In other jurisdictions, the state “must have access to the
alternative and be able to carry out the alternative method relatively
easily and reasonably quickly.”162 Thus, the states that follow the
former standard predetermine the very ability of an inmate to name
another alternative and the states could pass a statute denying any
alternative method from being considered altogether. This leaves the
inmates unable to challenge a state’s method of execution as being
present concrete factual issues that are well within the court’s adjudicative competence and the
state’s own knowledge).
157. See id. at 545.
158. See id. at 570.
159. Brief of Scholars and of Academics of Constitutional Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at *11, Bucklew v. Precythe, 2018 WL 3584093, (U.S July 23), petition for
cert. filed, (U.S. Mar. 15, 2018) (No. 17-8151) [hereinafter Brief of Scholars].
160. Id. at *16.
161. See id. at *16.
162. Id. at *12 (quoting McGehee, 854 F.3d at 493, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1275 (2017)).
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cruel and unusual.163 Under the latter standard, the same state that
reasoned that a “lack of an extensive history of use” was a basis to
reject an alternative methods of execution also found that execution
by firing squad was not a readily implemented alternative method164
even though it is one of the nation;s oldest and most easily performed
methods of execution.165 Thus, the uncertainty around what courts
would allow as an acceptible alternative method under Glossip
discourages inmates from asserting as-applied claims.
The states should share data concerning their methods of
execution, costs associated with different methods of execution, and
studies on public opinion. With this shared information, an inmate
would be able to offer an alternative practice in other states as long as
it is not cost-prohibitive and there is no proof of public outcry. For
example, an inmate should be able to offer execution by firing squad
as an alternative because other states use this method,166 and because
research indicates that it is an easy and inexpensive method.167 This
would provide inmates with more options when asserting a readily
feasible alternative method, increase the odds that they would be able
to successfully offer an alternative method, and decrease the risk that
they would suffer extreme pain.
Alternatively, the Court should categorically exempt from
execution those inmates who show that a medical condition puts them
at risk for severe suffering if the state’s protocol is followed without
accommodation and if there is no alternative method available to the
State. This type of categorical exemption would not radically deviate
from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence because the Court has made
similar determinations in the past based on age,168 and mental
illness.169 This exemption would reestablish the protection for inmates
at risk of severe suffering amd preserve the states’ power to inflict the
death penalty when constitutional violations are not implicated.

163. See id. at *18.
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting McGehee, 854 F.3d at 493, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1275 (2017)).
166. See id. at *23 (stating that Utah, Oklahoma and Mississippi currently authorize firing
squad as a method of execution) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-5.5; Oklahoma H.B. 1879 at §
1014(D); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-51).
167. See id.
168. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (invalidating the death penalty for inmates
who were under eighteen years old at the time the crime was committed).
169. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the death penalty is not
constitutional when an inmate is intellectually disabled).
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CONCLUSION

After seventy-five documented botched executions by lethal
injection,170 the warnings of the inmates and their medical experts can
no longer be ignored. The Supreme Court should take care to protect
the dignity of the Eighth Amendment and protect inmates from
undue burdens in avoiding inhumane executions. In considering a
multitude of options from shifting evidentiary burdens to creating an
exemption, a state’s ability to implement a death sentence should not
come at the cost of an inmate’s right to access the justice system.

170. See,
e.g.,
Botched
Executions,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-botched-executions (last visited Oct.
22, 2018).

